Commentary on Practical problems and obstacles to inflation targeting by Lars E.O. Svensson
where lt and l
–
t denote log employment and log
equilibrium employment, respectively, lt – l
–
t is the
employment gap, and λl>0 is the relative weight
on employment-gap stabilization.1
Let us look at the loss function in terms of the
output gap. There are three parameters there: δ,
π*, and λy. The δ, the discount factor, is very close
to 1 and not a big issue. The π* is the inflation target,
announced explicitly by an inflation targeter. There
remains only one parameter, the λy, the relative
weight on output-gap stabilization. The adjective
“flexible” in “flexible inflation targeting” has to do
with the value of λy.
The issue is really how to describe a loss function
of this type in words rather than a formula. I do not
believe the dual-hierarchical distinction helps in this
respect. But, if we must use it, we can think of this
loss function as saying something about the first
moments, the long-run means, of the target variables,
inflation and output; and the second moments, the
variability of the target variables around those means.
Regarding the first moments, there is a target
for long-run mean inflation, π*. This target is subject
to choice by the central bank or by its principal, the
government or the parliament, depending on the
institutional setup in the country. But the target for
output is not subject to choice. It is a “fact.” It is given
by the economy, by its potential output. Since poten-
tial output is an unobserved variable, it requires
estimation. We can say that the output target is sub-
ject to estimation, but it is certainly not subject to
choice. Alternatively, we can say that the output-gap
target is given at zero, and also not subject to choice.
Since there is a meaningful choice of the target for




arry Meyer has presented us with a fine paper
on practical problems and obstacles to infla-
tion targeting in the United States—a very
suitable paper for this great conference at the St.
Louis Fed. I find it a very thoughtful paper with
many good points. I agree with most of the points
Larry makes; I hope many people will read the
paper and, in particular, take seriously his proposal
for inflation targeting in the United States.
However, one issue that I believe Larry puts too
much weight on is his pet idea, the distinction
between a dual and hierarchical mandate. I do not
believe this distinction is very useful. We are all
flexible inflation targeters now. More precisely, we
are all talking about an intertemporal loss function
for monetary policy consisting of the expected dis-
counted sum of present and future period losses, that
is, of the form
,
where the period loss function is typically given by
.
Here, Et denotes expectations conditional on infor-
mation available in period t (typically a quarter), δ
is a discount factor and fulfills 0<δ<1, πt denotes
an inflation measure in period t (typically four-
quarter inflation for a specified price index), π*
denotes the inflation target, yt denotes log output,
y –
t denotes log potential output, yt – y –
t is the output
gap, and λy>0 is the relative weight on output-gap
stabilization relative to inflation-gap stabilization.
Alternatively, the period loss function can be
expressed in terms of employment,






















JULY/AUGUST 2004      161
1 The period loss function could also be expressed in terms of the
unemployment gap, ut – u –
t, instead of the employment gap, where ut
denotes unemployment and u –
t denotes equilibrium unemployment.
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output or the output gap, and therefore an asymme-
try between the two targets, we can, if we like, talk
about a hierarchical mandate for long-run inflation.
Regarding the second moments, the parameter
λy expresses the weight on the loss from output-gap
variability relative to the loss from inflation variabil-
ity. Whenever λy is positive, output-gap stability, as
well as inflation stability, is an objective. There is a
symmetry between the two variability objectives,
and we can, if we like, talk about a dual mandate for
inflation-gap variability and output-gap variability.
Since all inflation targeters are flexible inflation
targeters, in the sense that they are concerned about
stability of the real economy in addition to stability
of inflation, we can, if we like, talk about inflation
targeters as having a dual mandate. But, as long as
we know that we are talking about different verbal
descriptions of monetary policy loss functions of the
kind stated above, I do not find the dual/hierarchical
mandate distinction helpful. In particular, it is mis-
leading to say that inflation targeters have a hierar-
chical mandate but the Fed has not.
Let us compare the mandates for the Fed and
for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ). The
mandate for the Fed, as expressed in the Federal
Reserve Act, is: “[The Fed shall] promote effectively
the goals of maximum employment, stable prices,
and moderate long-term interest rates.” The mandate
for the RBNZ, as expressed in the 2002 Policy Target
Agreement (PTA), is: “[The RBNZ’s policy target] shall
be to keep future CPI inflation outcomes between 1
per cent and 3 per cent on average over the medium
term.” But the PTA also states that, “[i]n pursuing
its price stability objective, the Bank...shall seek to
avoid unnecessary instability in output, interest
rates and the exchange rate.”
First, I do not find the formulation of words in
the mandate for the Fed to be particularly well-
chosen. These words need careful interpretation to
be a meaningful mandate for monetary policy. The
expression “maximum employment” does not make
sense from the point of view of modern monetary
macroeconomics. Taken literally, it leads directly
down the inflation-bias lane of Kydland, Prescott,
Barro, and Gordon. Instead, the Fed prefers to deviate
from the words of the Federal Reserve Act by insert-
ing the word “sustainable” before “employment.”
This insertion allows the interpretation of “maximum
employment” as “equilibrium,” “natural,” or “poten-
tial” employment, which is required to make sense
of the mandate. This way, the mandate can be said
to describe a loss function like the ones above,
although without saying anything about the param-
eters, except that λl is positive.
Second, I do not see that the New Zealand PTA
says anything substantially different about the form
of the loss function than the (reinterpreted) U.S.
Federal Reserve Act. “Avoiding unnecessary instabil-
ity in output” can certainly be interpreted as “avoid-
ing unnecessary instability in the output gap” and
be seen as a verbal description of the loss function
above. Thus, the PTA says that the λy is positive, in
addition to specifying the parameter π* (the latter
we can interpret as the midpoint of the target range,
that is, 2 percent).2
In conclusion, I do not see that these two man-
dates are different in a way that makes it meaningful
to say that one is dual and the other is hierarchical.
To continue with Larry’s paper, his goals for a
change in the Fed framework are to improve trans-
parency and accountability and to enhance the
effectiveness of monetary policy, without funda-
mentally altering the basic approach to the conduct
of monetary policy under the Greenspan Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC). He goes on to
discuss the vision of the Greenspan FOMC and sum-
marizes it in three principles. I believe one could
add a fourth principle to these, namely, “Avoid com-
mitment, transparency, and accountability.” It seems
to me that the vision of the Greenspan FOMC includes
maintaining maximum discretion, including maxi-
mum discretion about interpreting and reinterpreting
the mandate. This is “flexibility,” but in a very differ-
ent—and rather undesirable—sense from the flexi-
bility in flexible targeting.
I believe the world has voted many times on
the Greenspan Fed versus inflation targeting. As far
as I know, no country has copied the vision of the
Greenspan Fed, but many countries have copied
the inflation-targeting framework of the RBNZ, the
Bank of England, and Sweden’s Riksbank. Further-
more, Michael Woodford’s (2004) paper for this
conference explains clearly and convincingly how
commitment and transparency are essential in mak-
ing more effective the management of expectations,
which is at the core of modern monetary policy,
and, in particular, how this provides a strong argu-
ment for inflation targeting. In my own work, for
instance, in Svensson (1999), I have emphasized
2 In my review of NZ monetary policy, Svensson (2001), a major issue
was whether the RBNZ had conducted monetary policy with the
appropriate degree of flexibility, that is, whether it had successfully
avoided unnecessary variability of output, interest rates, and the
exchange rate. My conclusion was that it had.
 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Svensson
JULY/AUGUST 2004      163
that inflation targeting is fundamentally a commit-
ment to sensible monetary policy objectives and to
transparency about those objectives. This puts infla-
tion targeting in stark contrast to this fourth principle
of the vision of the Greenspan FOMC.
Some have noted that the Fed has become more
transparent in recent years. This is true, but most of
it seems to consist of somewhat reluctant conces-
sions to outside pressure and the example set by the
inflation targeters rather than enthusiastic reforms
from within. I suggest that this fourth principle be
abandoned.
Larry goes on to discuss the politics of inflation
targeting, why to bother about a change in the frame-
work at all, why to do it now, and what the obstacles
are. He also discusses the case against inflation
targeting.
The case against has most explicitly been laid
out by Kohn (2003), with worries about the possible
loss of flexibility: “[T]he success of U.S. monetary
policy has in large part derived from its ability to
adapt to changing conditions—a flexibility that likely
has benefited from the absence of an inflation
target.”3 As far as I can see, the flexibility referred
to here is the flexibility to reinterpret the mandate
and change the monetary policy objectives. I believe
such flexibility is flexibility of the wrong kind.
Instead, I believe that all the flexibility we need is
the flexibility summarized in the λ above, the weight
on stabilization other than that of the inflation gap.
I do not see what prevents the Fed from announcing
an inflation target and becoming an explicit inflation
targeter and, in particular, introducing its own vari-
ant of inflation targeting, a high-λ, high-flexibility
one. Indeed, nothing prevents the Fed from being an
explicit super-flexible inflation targeter, if that is what
it wants to be. It may even call itself an “inflation-
and-output-gap targeter,” or an “inflation-and-real-
economy stabilizer,” or whatever. The Fed might
indeed want to set an example for the world, by
being the most flexible inflation targeter in history.
What I do not get is what the social benefit is from
the Fed being fuzzy about its objectives.4
In sum, there is simply no case against inflation
targeting for the United States. There is no downside
to inflation targeting for advanced countries. This
is furthermore demonstrated by the fact that no
country has, to my knowledge, had any regrets about
adopting inflation targeting. In contrast, the view
in these countries seems to be that it is the best
monetary policy regime they have ever had.
Larry goes on to discuss a number of practical
considerations, with many good and concrete sug-
gestions. He suggests not calling the monetary policy
report “Inflation Report,” but calling it “Monetary
Policy Report” instead. I have no quarrel with this.
Indeed, many inflation-targeting central banks call
their report something other than “Inflation Report”;
the RBNZ calls it “Monetary Policy Statement.” The
important thing is not the name but that it provides
the appropriate information.
In particular, I believe that the report should
ideally include forecasts of inflation, output, poten-
tial output, and the interest rate, with the appropriate
fan charts to indicate the uncertainty in these fore-
casts. The forecasts should be the best unconditional
forecasts; that is, they should be for the optimal
interest-rate path, the most likely future interest-rate
path. Only then do the forecasts provide the best
guide for private-sector expectations, and only then
does it make sense to compare the forecasts with
ex post outcomes. Furthermore, I believe the fore-
casts should extend to three years rather than the
standard two (the RBNZ and Bank of Norway already
have three-year forecasts). It is awkward when the
forecasts end at two years, since there is often quite
a bit of discussion of the two-year horizon. In most
cases, there would not be much specific information
about the third year, which implies that in most cases
the forecasts for the third year would be flat on target;
but it will be reassuring to the general public that
there is nothing dramatic lurking beyond the two-
year horizon that the central bank is aware of but
does not mention. Three-year forecasts would also
be more in line with the increasingly frequent refer-
ence to “the mid term.” In the interest of increased
transparency, I would humbly suggest that this term
be replaced by “1.5–3 years” or similar, whenever
possible.
A recent innovation of the Bank of Norway—
an enthusiastic newcomer to the inflation-targeting
camp that has moved straight into the group of best-
practice inflation targeters (see Svensson et al.,
2002)—is to plot the inflation forecast and the
output-gap forecast in the same graph (see chart 1
in Norges Bank, 2003). This clearly serves to empha-
size that the Bank is concerned with the stability of
the real economy as well as with inflation, emphasiz-
ing the flexibility in its inflation targeting.
Finally, Larry provides a concrete example of
3 See McCallum (2003) for a strong rebuttal of Kohn’s arguments.
4 Debelle (2003) provides an interesting description and discussion of
the flexible inflation targeting of the Reserve Bank of Australia.
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an inflation-targeting proposal for the Fed, with an
inflation target of 1.5 percent for the core PCE price
index, in line with the proposal of Goodfriend (2003).
I hope that a proposal similar to these is adopted
soon.
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